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Abstract: The problematic export of the Westphalian system to MENA is examined, taking 
Syria as exemplar. The export model is juxtaposed to actual non-lineal trajectories, semi-
sovereignty and hybrid or failing states. This is manifested in post-uprising Syria in failing 
statehood, fragmented and overlapping governance, permeable and collapsing borders, the 
loss of sovereignty to trans-state movements, “competitive regime-building” between the Asad 
regime and jihadist warlords, and “competitive interventionism” by external powers filling the 
governance vacuum with their own proxies. The result is heterarchic zones of limited 
statehood in which state sovereignty is contested by both international (supra-state) 
penetration and sub-state fragmentation. 
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The Westphalian system was supposedly exported to the MENA under Western 
imperialism and adopted with alacrity by state builders. Yet in MENA it has only ever 
been at best approximated and only for limited periods, reaching its peak in the 1980s, 
declining thereafter and reaching a nadir after the Arab uprising (2010-  ) when 
multiple state failures rippled across the region. In several areas, the Westphalian 
model seemingly collapsed, giving way to heterarchic zones of limited statehood in 
which the sovereignty of states was contested by both international (supra-state) 
penetration and sub-state fragmentation. This paper tries to understand why the 
outcome of Westphalian “export” reached the point of state failure in multiple cases and 
the heterarchic forms of governance that have replaced—or, more accurately, are 
contesting—the remnants of the Westphalian system.  
The first part of the paper recounts the Westphalian export narrative, and shows why 
and in what way a flawed, even perverted, Westphalian system made up of weak 
penetrated states, always vulnerable to failure, was exported to MENA. The second part 
of the paper shows that the vacuum of authority following state failure was filled by 
new “heterarchic” forms of governance. The argument is demonstrated in the case of 
Syria, which exemplifies such forms of governance in their starkest form. Here the 
collapse of Westphalian statehood was manifested in the state’s loss of territorial and 
border control, and penetration by trans-state movements, accelerated from without by 
the violation of Syria’s sovereignty by regional and international powers; in this 
vacuum, governance, is fragmented, overlapping, informal and violent.  
 
Export of a Flawed Westphalian States system 
The export of the Westphalian states system –i.e. Weberian states congruent with a 
national community (nation-states) that mutually recognize each other’s sovereignty—
to the non-Western world, including MENA, is widely assumed. It is implicit in Realism’s 
assumption of a globalized “anarchic” (no central governance) system of equally 
sovereign states. The export process is explicitly recounted in the International Society 
literature (Bull and Watson 1984; Buzan and Little 2010;). In a first movement, Western 
imperialism constituted ”states” from above—mere territorial “shells” suiting their geo-
political interest; in a second movement, after de-colonization indigenous state builders 
tried to fill these shells with content—Weberian institutions, national identities. This is 
because nation-states were perceived to be the most effective model of governance: the 
more the incongruence of state and nation, the more the legitimacy deficit and the 
greater vulnerability to separatism and irredentism; while the greater the congruence, 
the better states could nationally mobilize their populations so as to compete in the 
international power struggle (Smith 1981; Gellner 2006). For Realists and World Polity 
theorists, state builders, “socialized” into the rules of international politics, tried to 
emulate the internationally successful Westphalian nation-state (Waltz, 1979; Meyer 
et.al; 1997). In MENA this began with Ottoman “defensive modernization” and came 
best to be exemplified in Ataturk’s forging of a Turkish nation-state out of Ottoman 
ruins. Arab leaders who inherited states in the former Ottoman domains faced the 
greater obstacle of Western-imposed arbitrary borders cutting across identity 
fragmented societies, but, similarly, sought to forge the nation from above accompanied 
by Weberian state centralization of power, Yet, with the Arab Uprisings, that project 
apparently ended in spectacular failure in many MENA states. This is not entirely 
inexplicable for it was by no means inevitable that Westphalia would effectively “take” 
outside the West where it originated. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that it has 
always been a normative construction in global discourse or an Weberian ideal type in 
scholarly analysis, often violated or much diluted in practice (Krasner 1999; Risse 
2013). However, the actual deviation from the ideal type has grown increasingly 
obvious, particularly in the current Middle East, for several reasons and as exemplified 
in several phenomena. 
Identity/Territorial Incongruity: First, the outcome of Westphalian export in MENA 
lacked the apparent legitimacy benefits of a nation-state system. In this arid region of 
trading cities and nomadic tribes, the strongest identifications attached to sub-state 
units—cities, tribe, religious sects—or the larger Islamic umma; Islamic empires built 
on these identities and since their boundaries fluctuated greatly as they rose and fell, 
identifications with territorial states were tepid (Weuleresse 1946: 79-83). But equally 
important, arbitrary Western imposition of boundaries erected major additional 
obstacles to the nation-state model. The incongruence between the territorial states and 
pre-existing supra and sub-state identities, exacerbated by arbitrary boundary 
imposition cutting across identity fragmented societies, was especially marked in the 
Arab mashreq where, following the infamous WWI “Sykes-Picot agreement,” the 
dismantling of historic Syria led to a continuing contestation of state legitimacy by 
competing supra- and sub-state identities. This kept states vulnerable to internal 
insurgency, irredentism, and trans-state interference. Thus, what was exported to the 
region were initially quasi-states, in Jackson’s (1993) term, arguably, set up to fail but 
nevertheless sustained by international guarantees against absorption by stronger 
regional powers—thus, sustaining a system of weak states as Lustik (1997) argued. 
Hybrid power technologies: Once post-decolonization indigenous state-builders sought 
to enforce effective sovereignty, they adapted imported Weberian political technology 
to indigenous political culture, resulting in hybrid outcomes (Bacik 2008). For Weber, 
indeed, modern “legal rational” authority was only the end point of a long evolution and 
in pre-modern periods of “primitive power accumulation” other forms of authority had 
dominated, namely, the charismatic and the patrimonial, ideal types inspired by 
Weber’s reading of Ibn Khaldun, the “father of sociology.” When the Weberian rational-
legal model was exported to regions still engaged in this power accumulation, the 
region’s historically proven Khaldunian power building practices would, as path 
dependency suggests, inevitably get reproduced; when combined with partly-
“imported” bureaucratic practices, the result would be hybrids such as neo-
patrimonialism. Such a formation, benefiting from its congruence with widely 
understood historic practices, may be quite robust for extended periods of time; but 
since charismatic and patrimonial authority, as Ibn Khaldun showed, inevitably 
decline—so also will neo-patrimonial regimes unless this is counter-acted by the 
development of the rational institutional side of the regime. Indeed, over the long term, 
the more mobilized societies that accompany socio-economic modernization cannot be 
effectively governed without this corresponding political modernization (Bank and 
Richter 2010)—which, however, tended to lag behind societal mobilization. 
Semi-sovereignty to neo-medievalism: far from seeking to export sovereign states, the 
Western core powers, in fragmenting the Middle East into a multitude of weak states, 
actually sought to establish a hierarchy in which MENA states inhabited the bottom 
rungs. The sovereignty of such weak states was (as Krasner (1999) argued in calling 
sovereignty “organized hypocrisy”) frequently violated by the military intervention of 
the core states. During the Cold war nationalist movements took power across the 
Middle East and took advantage of great power rivalries to gain, for a period, greater 
sovereignty. Subsequently, however, the core has sought to reverse this diffusion of 
power to the periphery and re-constitute periphery states as merely semi-sovereign 
(Clark 2001). First, without countervailing Soviet power, military intervention against 
defiant nationalist regimes took the extreme form of state deconstruction—e.g. the Iraq 
war, intervention in Libya. Second, globalization turned regional states into 
transmission belts of neo-liberalism (Cox 1996). This has encountered resistance from 
victimized underclasses mobilized via either supra-state ideologies such as Islamism, or 
fragmenting ethnic and religious identities (Barber 1995), catching the state in a pincer 
movement from above and below. The result of globalization is a certain reversal of 
Westphalian order, in which states are everywhere ceding authority to supra and sub-
state levels in what Bull (1995: 254-55) called Neo-Medievalism; however this happens 
very unevenly and most intensely in the weak states of the global periphery. Thus, 
rather than a simple export of Westphalian sovereignty to the periphery, the actual 
degree of sovereignty acquired by MENA states has been the outcome of an on-going 
struggle between Western penetration and resistance/collaboration by states and 
movements in the periphery. 
Non-linear trajectories: for all these reasons, state formation in the region has described, 
not a progressive approximation of the Westphalian state system, but a bell-shaped 
curve in which state-builders’ attempts to approximate it reached, from a starting point 
of very weak statehood, a peak and then went into decline, a process co-constituted by 
the interaction of global level forces (constraints, intervention, resources) and regional 
state building projects. From the 1960s, rent from both great power patrons and the oil 
boom enabled consolidation of more inclusive forms of neo-patrimonialism based on a 
populist-nationalist social contract, notably in the republics. However, by the nineties 
state decline had set in, corresponding to neo-liberal globalization under US hegemony, 
which, combined with falls in rent, propelled a retreat in MENA states’ inclusiveness 
under pressure from IMF-promoted “structural adjustment” and the rise of crony 
capitalism (empowered by IMF-imposed privatizations of public sectors). While 
authoritarian regimes proved quite resilient in adapting to neo-liberalism, e.g. creating 
crony capitalist support and off loading welfare responsibilities to Islamists, under the 
surface the seeds that would drive the Arab uprising were being planted. Arab 
authoritarian republics, in particular, experienced a destabilizing combination of 
Western export of neo-liberalism that narrowed the basis of their rule with democracy 
campaigns that de-legitimized them as they reneged on the populist social contracts on 
which they had built their social bases. The victims of neo-liberalism withdrew their 
loyalty from the state and attached it to sub/trans-state movements and identities, 
Islamism, sectarianism, and ethnicity. Thus, as state’s strength declined, so 
correspondingly did their penetration by global forces and vulnerability to mobilizing 
sub/trans-state movements relatively increase. 
Failing Statehood, proxy wars: If the Weberian state is the apex of Westphalian order, its 
nadir is the failed state. Far from an anomaly, failed states have come to constitute a fifth 
of world states (40 out of 200), marking a transition, Edward Newman (2009) suggests, 
to a post-Westphalian world where sovereignty gives way to intervention and wars are 
intra- rather than inter-state. This wave of state failure is widely attributed to the pincer 
in which states are caught of globalization from above and resistance (jihad) to it from 
below by fragmenting identity movements. MENA states, especially those in the Arab 
mashreq, were, owing to their initial identity/territory incongruence and potential neo-
patrimonial decline, especially vulnerable. But it took precipitating factors at the 
international level to tip weak states into failed ones: Iraq’s deconstruction by the 
combination of US invasion and sectarian civil war within, set off regional de-
stabilization; and once civil conflict broke out in several states, competitive interference 
by global and regional powers resulted in proxy wars further driving state failures. 
Heterarchic Non-Westphalian Governance: State failure does not mean a lack of 
governance, nor the replacement of formal hierarchy by anarchy; rather the vacuum it 
leaves is rapidly filled by multiple competing actors with authority over limited areas, 
none of which are able to re-establish state-wide Weberian hierarchy—a situation of 
heterarchy (Donnelly 2016), or “oligopoly of violence” in which some contenders 
establish enough local “order” to mute or contain violent anarchy and within certain 
areas sufficient predominance that “limited statehood” (Risse 2013) may be said to 
prevail. Power is contested or jurisdictions shared between the remnants of the pre-
existing regimes and rebel governance, global and regional interventionists and newly 
empowered trans-state social movements. Hybridity results from the interaction of 
“traditional” and  “modern,” formal and informal, local and international  (McGinty 
2011). This governance is fragmented, informal, grassroots, fluid and often violent. The 
following account details this phase of state deconstruction in the Syrian case and the 
forms of hybrid governance that filled the vacuum.  
  
The Collapse of the Westphalian Project in Syria 
Rise and Decline of the Ba’thist Regime 
State building under the Ba’th had consolidated the Syrian state along semi-
Westphalian lines, with the regime penetrating and integrating its territory and 
acquiring the capabilities to defend sovereignty from external threats. Indeed, Hafiz al-
Asad’s power-building formula—the use of sectarian assabiya to create a loyal elite core 
in charge of the security forces combined with a mass-inclusive single party penetrating 
the villages and populist distribution (land reform)--produced a particularly robust 
form of neo-patrimonialism. While in the early independence years Syria had been 
notoriously vulnerable to external penetration, making it a battleground of rival 
external powers, by the seventies Asad had made Syria an actor on the regional stage 
(Hinnebusch 1990).  
The decline of this state building project came in parallel to its attempt to adapt to the 
neo-liberal world. The Syrian uprising was rooted in the ills of neo-liberal driven post-
populism: the enrichment of crony capitalists and the reneging on the social contract, 
shrinking social entitlements for the poor, and the consequent weakening of the Ba’th 
Party’s co-optative capacity. The demonstration effect of the Arab uprising precipitated 
anti-regime protests in Syria, swelled by those aggrieved by post-populism in “under-
governed” areas—the rural migrants of the shantytowns and the neglected eastern 
provinces.  
It was by no means inevitable that protests would lead to civil war and state failure. 
Why this happened is beyond the scope of this study, but very briefly: the regime’s use 
of excessive violence against protestors only inflamed the uprising; the dominance of 
hard liners on both sides, precluding a transition pact, with sectarian discourses 
instrumentalized on both sides; the continued loyalty of the core security forces willing 
to use violence against protestors, combined with considerable defection from the army 
rank and file that organized into a counter-army (the Free Syrian Army); the 
militarization of the opposition and the regime’s loss of control over more far-flung 
parts of the country, creating shifting front lines between regime and opposition 
control; and external intervention on behalf of the opposition and later to shore up the 
regime, which funnelled the arms and money to continue the conflict, followed by the 
arrival of foreign jihadists—all these factors drove Syria’s trajectory of deepening 
conflict (Hinnebusch 2012; Hinnebusch, Imady, Zintl 2015).  
 
Civil War, State failure:      
Civil war and state failure paralleled and reinforced each other in Syria, manifesting all 
the features of Kaldor’s (2005) “New Wars.” Syria experienced what might be called a 
“double state failure” combining, at the material level, the state’s loss of monopoly of 
violence and territorial control to non-state armed movements with, at the ideational 
level, a shrinking of inclusive identifications with the state and spread of rival sectarian 
narratives.  
The latter was driven by a “security dilemma” (Posen 1993). Massive violence, with the 
regime use of heavy weapons against cities and car bombings by terrorists, combined 
with the widespread breakdown of order, precipitated reliance by people on local 
armed militias of their own identity group for protection. Local Warlords with sufficient 
armed capacity and a claim to defend their identity group emerged, ostensibly to fill the 
security gap but making all less secure. Episodes of sectarian cleansing and demonizing 
of the “other” at the grassroots led many Syrians to identify with fellow sectarians 
outside Syria rather that with other Syrians of different sectarian affiliations.  
The widespread arming of self-defence militias and recruitment to fighting factions 
fostered what Abboud (2016: 85-86) called the “civilianization of war,” as the 
proportion of the population engaged in violence dramatically expanded. This eroded 
the distinction between combatants and non-combatants and led to massive deaths, 
internal dislocation and cross border refugee flows.  
 
Fragmentation of “rebel governance” 
When the Syrian state failed, its administrative reach contracting from areas lost to 
opposition forces, the resulting “ungoverned space” was filled by informal, “rebel” or 
hybrid governance. The gap in service provision was initially filled by local councils 
born out of the local coordination committees that had organized anti-regime protests, 
as well as by civil society movements. Opposition activists saw this local governance as 
coming to constitute an institutional alternative to regime rule. However, it was highly 
localized, with coordination reliant on intermittently functioning networks, resulting in 
increasing fragmentation. This was exacerbated by regional level backing for rival 
groups and the third layer of “governance” by international donors who channelled 
funds, along with their own conflicting agendas, through rival external opposition 
groups or private sub-contractors (with the result that only a fraction of it reached the 
grassroots in Syria) (Khalaf 2015; Abboud 2016: 180-182).  
Fragmentation was deepened by the militarization of the uprising. Initially, highly 
localized fighting groups arose to defend their own areas against regime violence and 
formed the armed wing of the local councils. Although repeated attempts were made to 
amalgamate these into a single opposition army, the Free Syrian Army, with a central 
command structure, these had limited success, partly because FSA HQ could not provide 
resources, and fighters had to rely on external funders who financed their own clients, 
encouraging splits between Saudi, and Qatari funded factions.  In 2013, there were 1000 
brigades and three thousand smaller units. They did periodically come together in 
“fronts” attempting coordination against the regime but often subsequently splintered 
and lacked any durable common strategy. Formations large enough to hold and expand 
territory did not, therefore, emerge as groups became satisfied with profiting from local 
fiefdoms. To the extent the FSA units became local warlords profiting on protection 
rackets, they lost their popular character (Abboud 2016: 81-95). Competition over 
control of lucrative checkpoints and oil resources became a frequent source of 
opposition infighting. The FSA was so dependent for funding by external sponsors via 
Turkey and Jordan that these two countries were able to turn its factions into their 
proxies fighting, not Asad, but the enemies they had inadvertently created by their 
original attempt to destabilize Asad—the Islamic State and, for Turkey, the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) (LeGrande 2016). Another force of fragmentation was 
the increased Islamization of the fighting groups and indeed the rise of jihadist 
movements that saw the FSA as a rival and frequently attacked it; moreover, Islamist 
movements injected ideological rivalries into the opposition, which often resulted in 
inter-Islamist splits. Thus, IS and Jabhat al-Nusra started as affiliates of al-Qaida in Iraq, 
but split and the first battles of IS in Syria were with Nusra and other Islamists for 
domination, starting with its seizure of Raqqa from the former. The most successful 
jihadist “front,” that formed from an alliance of Nusra and Ahrar ash-Sham, the “Army of 
Conquest” that captured Idlib in 2015, had by 2017 broken up as the former turned on 
and defeated the latter. At the same time, the threat of jihadists to the religious and 
ethnic minorities led to their establishing protective militias, also contributing to 
fragmentation, with the PYD the most successful of these. This fragmented (and 
reciprocal mobilization), left everybody, less, not more secure (Abboud 2016:97-108, 
162-87; Lawson 2014). The result was that the conflict became a war of attrition in 
which advances by both sides were incremental and difficult to hold, leading to a 
patchwork of control among a multitude of groups.  
Further reinforcing fragmentation was the shrinking of the normal economy as the 
national market disintegrated and internal trade barriers sprung up, controlled by 
fighters levying taxes on the flow of goods. At the same time, the fragmented regions 
were more intensely linked economically to the outside of Syria than hitherto. Abboud 
(2014) argues that as internal production declined, the inward flows of resources, 
including humanitarian aid and funding from opposition sponsors, became the main 
prizes over which rivals struggled. In parallel, as civil war made normal economic life 
more precarious, young men became dependent on salaries from armed groups 
dominated by localized warlords who resorted to smuggling, kidnapping and taxation of 
goods at checkpoints, as well as external funding and which therefore had an incentive 
to keep the fighting going. The most militant jihadist groups expanded at the expense of 
the FSA because they had access to superior funding from external patrons or were 
more able to seize resources, such as oil fields (Abboud 2014, Yaziji 2014, Turkmani 
2015). In places under siege, pro and anti government armed groups used check points 
to extract resources from the population in a process that redistributed wealth from the 
poorest to a new war rich (Todman 2016). 
 
Overlapping Governance 
A key feature of hybrid governance is overlap in the jurisdiction of rival authorities. In 
Syria such overlap has been a constant feature. In the early years of the uprising, 
government officials delivering key services in opposition areas continued to be paid 
salaries by the central government, which sought to depict itself as the legitimate state 
on which citizens were reliant for basic services. In Kurdish areas, PYD and Syrian 
government officials co-existed, with the regime officials and school curriculum 
carrying on in the main cities even after the army withdrew. In Manbij opposition locals 
asked government officials to keep working and they continued to be paid by the 
regime: the government land registry personal continued operation and electricity, 
water and local flour mills were run by paid government officials. The overlap between 
regime and opposition jurisdictions challenges the over-simplicity of a regime-
opposition dichotomy (Ali 2015) 
Much later in the uprising, a growing wave of truces or de-escalation zones between 
regime and opposition led to a patchwork of power-sharing arrangements on the 
regime/opposition front lines. The regime, facing manpower shortages that precluded 
the re-conquest of opposition areas, resorted to imposing settlements, piece by piece, 
via bombing and/or sieges, on the margins of government controlled areas. In the 
Damascus area, for example, the regime benefited from the opposition’s fragmentation, 
inability to coordinate combined offensives and vulnerability to being picked off one by 
one. Populations became alienated as opposition fighters failed to shield people from 
the regime’s sieges and air assaults as well as by their infighting over control of supplies 
and access points, personal power and doctrinal differences (among Islamists); it was 
often popular pressure on the fighters that led them to accept truces with the regime 
(Glass 2017; Lund 2017a).  
The extent of overlapping jurisdiction varied widely according to the particular deal 
negotiated, itself a function of the power balance between the sides. Under one type of 
deal, such as that reached in Barzeh in 2014, rebels maintained control of their areas in 
return for handing over heavy weaponry and halting attacks on regime forces; in return, 
sieges were lifted, return of the displaced allowed and public utilities restored (Hamlo 
2015). In Dera muhafazat, much of the town of al-Sanamayn had fallen out of regime 
control and opposition local councils were set up, though most of the public services 
were still provided by the regime. The regime laid siege to the opposition-controlled 
neighbourhoods, which was lifted under an agreement that the rebels would not attack 
regime positions or personnel. Some (not all) weapons were handed over but 
opposition fighters continued to control much of the town while regime security forces 
remained on the outskirts (al-Tamimi 2017).  
Permeable Borders:  
While Syria’s borders had always had a certain permeability, when there was a strong 
regime (1970-2000) they hardened significantly. With state failure, however, the 
country was open to penetration as never before. Legally, borders remained recognized 
by the international community but defacto they were now routinely violated by 
external powers. Even as Syria fragmented within and new defacto internal borders 
arose on the frontlines controlled by armed groups and checkpoints, the government 
lost control of its many of its external borders, leading to increased interconnectedness 
across them (DelSarto 2017), seen in the flow of resources, fighters and refugees, to and 
from neighbouring countries. Syrian activists in neighbouring countries or further 
abroad networked into and supported opposition areas as well as remaining connected 
with the country via virtual (internet) communities (Hamdan 2017).  
Control of borders was a strategic asset for opposition factions and Syria’s borders were 
fragmented into segments controlled by rival groups. Border control was crucial to 
taxing, controlling the flow of humanitarian aid, oil, fighters, smuggled goods and 
weapons into Syria from outside funders, NGOs and states, as well as export of such 
commodities as oil. Battles took place over supply routes, e.g. the Kurdish-dominated 
Syrian Democratic forces (SDF) took Manbij to cut off IS access to Turkey and Turkey 
launched Euphrates Shield in August 2016 both to dislodge IS from Jarabalus and to 
prevent the Kurds from linking up their western and eastern cantons on the border. 
Syria’s borderlands—boundaries in depth—became, as the state’s control contracted, 
areas of contestation in which tribes and trans-state movements were empowered and 
safe havens for fighters and platforms for international NGOs were concentrated. The 
opposition fighters depended on safe havens—rear bases, training facilities—near the 
Turkish and Jordanian borders. Syria’s neighbours selectively softened and hardened 
the borders, seeking to both intervene in the conflict yet prevent spillover and 
blowback. Thus, Turkey opened its border to refugees, provided a safe haven for 
opposition fighters, and allowed IS to transit fighters and oil flows across its borders; 
but when IS turned against it, and refugees flows became too onerous, Turkey hardened 
the border, building a wall in places and stopping the easy flow of refugees and fighters 
(Vignal 2017; Lund 2017b; DelSarto 2017; Khateb 2017b).  
 
Rising trans-state actors, merging political space, border-busting projects 
The failure of states and the rise of armed non-state actors made Syria and Iraq an 
interconnected field of contestation in which trans-state groups moved back and forth 
as the power struggle dictated, contesting state borders and sovereignty in an utterly 
unprecedented way.  
The Syria conflict rapidly spilled over as Iraqi actors took sides in Syria, symptomatic of 
the trans-state identities linking the two states. Euphrates Valley tribes from Iraq’s 
Anbar province sent money, weapons and thousands of fighters to support their anti-
Asad Syrian cousins in Deir al-Zur (Knights 2012); with historic familial and financial 
links to ruling elites in the Gulf states, cross-border tribes were conduits of Riyadh’s 
anti-Asad policy and of arms deliveries to the Syrian insurgents. The fighting in eastern 
Syria also spilled over in Iraq when Syrian insurgents attacked Syrian regime forces 
taking refuge on Iraqi soil, even killing Iraq troops (Knights, 2012; El-Hamed 2013).  
As the Syrian conflict turned into civil war the Syrian opposition took on an ever more 
jihadist flavour that operated trans-state, seeing the struggles against non-Sunni rule in 
Iraq and Syria as inseparable. Thus, Iraqi Sunnis jihadists from Mosul joined the Syrian 
Jabhat al-Nusra and passed on their technology of car bombings and IUDs learned in the 
Iraqi insurgency.  Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra declared that “fighting against the Shiite Iraqi 
government in Baghdad is a jihad and sacred religious duty in order to liberate it from 
the Magi” (i.e. Persians) (El-Hamed 2013). Giving a yet greater trans-state sectarian 
dimension to the struggle was the internationalization of the Syrian conflict as Sunni 
jihadists from outside the Levant flocked to Syria to fight the Asad regime, particularly 
recruited by the two trans-state al-Qaida avatars, Jabhat al-Nusra and IS. By 2015, 
around 27,000 Sunni foreign fighters from 86 countries were fighting the regimes in 
Iraq and Syria, with 16,000 from MENA, 5,000 from Europe, and 4,700 from former 
Soviet republics (Guardian 8 December 2015), many of them armed or given transit 
routes into Syria by the Sunni powers opposed to Asad—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar—
and funded by rich nationals of the Gulf states. 
In reaction to this, Lebanon’s Shia Hezbollah movement increasingly intervened on 
behalf of the regime, a strategic ally against Israel. Iran mobilized Iraqi and Afghan Shia 
militias to protect Shia mosques and communities near Damascus after jihadist attacks 
on the Sayyida Zaynab mosque which had fed a narrative that the Shia were on the 
defensive against Sunni takfiris who considered Shiites as heretics liable to be killed.  
However, the Iraqi Shia militias soon became involved on the side of the Syrian regime 
at a time when it was very much on the defensive, with some 5000-10,000 fighting 
alongside Hizbollah and contributing materially to tilting the power balance back 
toward the regime, particularly at the 2013 battle of Qusayr (Tamimi, 2015). While in 
2012 Iraqi Shia militias had been reluctant to be seen to “intervene” in Syrian affairs (al-
Salhy 2012), by 2014-15 they boasted of it, as the two countries were now considered 
parts of an inseparable regional conflict stretching from Yemen to Lebanon. Hardened 
and zealous veterans of urban warfare, Shia militiamen soon became shock troops 
spearheading Syrian regime offensives against Sunni insurgents. When, with the IS 
conquest of Mosul, many Shia militias fighting in Syria returned to Iraq to counter IS, 
leaving Asad with an acute manpower problem, Iranian Quds commander, Qasem 
Soleimani, replaced them with Afghan Shia fighters. At the same time, Iran and 
Hizbollah helped incorporate the plethora of pro-regime local militias, whether Shia, 
Christian or other, into the regime’s National Defense Force, trained and advised by 
Hizbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers, thereby propelling a certain 
“Shiaization” of Asad’s decentralizing regime. This spurred increasing resentment 
among the opposition in Syria: a Syrian jihadist website warned the Shia in Syria: “This 
land is forbidden to you. This is the land of Omar and Abu Bakr” (Bulos 2017). Thus, a 
trans-state arena of conflict, represented as a regional sectarian battle and embracing 
the whole Levant, had eclipsed state-bounded ones 
As state failures opened the door to the rise of powerful trans-state/non-state 
movements, the permanence of borders and the sovereignty of the states came under 
threat, portending a possible remaking of the states system (Stanfield 2013). While only 
a minority in Iraq and Syria wanted a re-drawing of the boundaries of their states, 
armed trans-state movements took advantage of the debilitation of states’ territorial 
control to advance boundary-busting projects.  
The Syrian uprising strengthened the Kurds’ national and separatist ambitions. Syrian 
Kurdish regions became effectively autonomous of Damascus under the PYD, in parallel 
with the more consolidated autonomy enjoyed by the Kurdish Regional Government in 
Iraq. The PYD derived legitimacy from the relative order it introduced into Kurdish 
areas, its ability to defend the Kurds against IS as well as posing as protector of Arab 
moderates and minorities against jihadists. The PYD project did not reject the 
Westphalian system, per se, only the boundaries that had denied the Kurds nation-
statehood after WWI. Officially aiming for autonomy within Syria, it did not even overtly 
challenge Syrian sovereignty, merely “softening” it; assuming, however, that its long-
term goal was an independent Kurdistan, it could be said to seek to join the Westphalian 
system, not overthrow it. 
Very different was the Islamic State (IS) project. The collapse of Syrian and Iraqi state 
control over their territories allowed IS to seize control over wide areas of western Iraq 
and eastern Syria, declaring the abolition of the Syrian-Iraq border as part of the 
construction of a transnational “Caliphate,” explicitly touted as overthrowing “Sykes-
Picot.” Its legitimacy was based on an explicit rejection of Westphalian state boundaries 
in favour of endless expansion within the dar al-harb. IS originated as al-Qaida in Iraq 
(AQI), which grew up in the anarchy created by the US destruction of the Saddam 
Hussein regime. When AQI was defeated by the US in Iraq its remnants found safe-
haven in Syria and the later collapse of Syrian state control over eastern parts of the 
country allowed it, now rebranded Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), to seize Raqqa 
and other parts of the east of the country. Indicative of the high level of inter-state 
permeability was the penetration by ISIS fighters as far west as Lebanon. Truly trans-
national, ISIS was a coalition including AQI, ex-Iraqi Ba’thists made jobless by the US 
occupation and legions of Sunni “foreign” fighters who flocked to Syria. In 2014 ISIS 
seized Mosul and proclaimed a caliphate straddling western Iraq and eastern Syria, 
shortening its name to Islamic State (IS). Having previously faced opposition in Syria 
from more Syria-centric elements of the Islamic opposition, including al-Qaida avatar, 
Jabhat al-Nusra, IS turned the momentum acquired in Iraq after Mosul (and the heavy 
weapons captured from the Iraqi army), to surge back across the border and put its 
Syrian rivals on the defensive. It benefited from the bandwagoning of disparate Syrian 
Islamist groups opposed to Asad who pledged fealty: some embraced IS because it had 
superior financial and military resources provided by Gulf donors or seized from the 
failing Iraqi and Syrian states while others submitted out of fear of its murderous 
reputation. It also had a powerful religious message and a claim to protect Sunnis, 
tapping into wide Sunni dissatisfaction with the non-Sunni regimes in both Syria and 
Iraq.1  
This showed how porous were the regional states’ “artificial” boundaries and again 
raised the issue of their permanence: the unmaking of the Versailles imposed-
Westphalian system was no longer unthinkable. The territories ruled by the Kurdish 
PYD and by IS, could be said to constitute “reverse quasi-states”—deprived of external 
sovereignty (recognition) but enjoying effective (even if temporary) internal 
sovereignty. However, regional states continued to fight back against these revisionist 
forces and in doing so enjoyed the backing of great power patrons also loath to see 
state-remaking or the emergence of what they considered terrorist safe havens. 
 
Debilitated Sovereignty: from competitive interference to “sphere of foreign influence” 
Sovereignty had always been jealously guarded by regional states just because it is so 
precarious. With state failure, external sovereignty was still technically recognized, 
making for classic “quasi-states” in Syria and elsewhere. Indicative of the claims of 
sovereignty was that international organizations could not deliver cross-border 
humanitarian aid to Syria without the agreement of Damascus and only through regime 
controlled areas until a July 2014 UNSC resolution authorized delivery to opposition 
controlled areas. This marked a de jure qualification of Syrian sovereignty, but de facto, 
it has been violated on a regular basis since it became, from at least 2012, an arena of 
“competitive interference” by rival outside powers backing different clients in Syria’s 
power struggle. Not just regional powers but CIA funded operations centres in Jordan 
and Turkey financed, armed and trained proxies intervening against the internationally 
recognized government in Damascus and in violation of international law.  
In this game of competitive interference in Syria, however, it was pro-regime Iran that 
held the advantage, for, as Pierret (2016) argued, as a revolutionary state it had an 
ideology that inspired proxies such as Hizbollah and its Iraqi avatars and experience in 
the organization and training of paramilitaries and in asymmetric warfare. Moreover, it 
was able not only to impart anti-insurgent capabilities to the Syrian army but to field 
militias fighting alongside it that blunted opposition momentum. Turkey and the Gulf 
monarchies lacked this capacity and could only provide funding, arms and, in Turkey’s 
case, a safe-haven for Syrian exiles and this did not guarantee reliable proxies that could 
be coordinated against Damascus; rather, the rivalries of the anti-Asad states frustrated 
coordination, with the Saudis favouring the FSA and Qatar, together with Turkey, 
backing Islamists like Ahrar ash-Sham, Ikhwan offshoots and even radical jihadists such 
as al-Nusra and IS which often fought each other. Only when these external patrons 
agreed to set aside their differences could they impose enough unity on the opposition 
factions to make advances against the regime on the battlefield, as in 2015 when the 
jointly sponsored “Army of Conquest” captured Idlib; but this was the exception. As 
such, competitive interference, while bolstering the cohesion of the regime, deepened 
rather than overcoming the fragmentation of the opposition. 
The fragmenting impact of competitive external interference seemed after 2016 to take 
the form of a defacto carving up of Syria into overlapping spheres of influence. The 
violation of Syria’s sovereignty became much more overt as outside great powers were 
drawn in to fight IS and accelerated by their race to fill the power vacuum where IS was 
in retreat under air assaults. While Russian intervention was invited by the government 
and aimed to help Damascus re-establish its territorial control, US backed proxies such 
as the SDF aimed to seize Raqqa from IS for itself, an intervention characterized by 
Syria’s UN ambassador as an “invasion” (Independent 2017). Jordanian-backed forces 
separately were positioning themselves to target Deir ez-Zor with its strategic oil fields 
and border crossing at Abu Kamal. That the US sought to prevent the Damascus 
government from re-establishing control over its territory was clear from its attacks on 
pro-government forces when they advanced toward SDF positions near Raqqa and 
toward the country’s eastern borders at Tanf (Azizi 2017). Said the Syrian government 
of US warnings that it should not advance to Deir ez-Zor: “it’s laughable to listen to calls 
asking an army of a sovereign state to stay away from its borders.”  In fact, the Syrian 
government remained in the race to Deir ez-Zor and its forces and allied Iraqi militias 
met up at the Syria-Iraq border (Hashem 2017); but the SDF seized key oil fields near 
Deir ez-Zor. As the battle with IS wound down, the US was poised to establish a semi-
permanent “protectorate” over PYD/SDF controlled territory in eastern Syria. At the 
same time, the Astana negotiations were seen to aim at a Russian-sponsored division of 
Syrian territory into Turkish, Jordanian, Iranian and Russian spheres of influence. 
Turkey was setting up police and courts in areas under its proxy control (Khatib 2017a). 
Russian private security firms were given concessions over mineral and energy sites if 
they could capture them from IS. Russia and Iran exercised unprecedented influence in 
regime-controlled areas (Trombetta 2017).  
 
Competitive state re-formation: polarizing rival projects 
With the division of the country into regime and opposition controlled areas, a dynamic 
that could be called “competitive state re-formation” emerged, with two exclusivist 
militarized would-be-states dominating the competition—the regime rump vs. the 
jihadists—that is, those best able to play the Khaldunian cards that succeed in intensive 
power struggles. The two contenders squeezed out rival projects, checked each other 
and, both more coercive and less inclusive than the pre-uprising regime, seemed 
incapable of nationalizing their governance, leading to de-facto separation along 
incrementally changing battle lines. 
The Asad regime: The regime adapted to civil war by adopting a more violent, 
exclusivist and de-centralized form of neo-patrimonialism. The core—the Asad family, 
the security services, elite army units—represented a contraction of the top elite to its 
more coercive and sectarian elements as all those who had advocated compromise or 
power-sharing with the opposition, mostly Sunnis, such as former Vice President al-
Sharaa, were expelled from the elite while war profiteering regime-connected crony 
capitalists were incorporated. This core rested on several pillars. The Alawi sect was 
absorbed en-mass into the army, security apparatus, and state, with some 500,000 
living in Alawi suburbs of Damascus; implicated in the regime’s crimes, suffering high 
casualties, facing an existential threat if the regime collapsed, they were the main 
loyalist base, potentially disaffected only when the regime failed to effectively protect 
them from the jihadist threat. What was hitherto a main regime pillar, the regular 
(cross-sectarian) Syrian army, was downsized, owing to defections and resistance to 
conscription. It was reconfigured for counter-insurgency and defections stopped but 
morale and performance remained variable. It still incorporated Sunnis who had 
enjoyed upward mobility through military careers, identified with the army and lived in 
their own military communities. As the regular army contracted, militias filled the gap, 
allowing pro-regime communities to assume the burden of their own self-defence: 
informal client networks headed by businessmen-patrons or else sectarian groups set 
up militias self-financed through protection rackets, extortion and pillage. The regime 
tried to counter the fragmentation of armed groups through their incorporation into the 
National Defense Forces (NDF), but the militias often remained immune to command 
from above; for example, Alawi militias obstructed a number of regime-attempted 
reconciliation deals with opposition (Sunni) towns. The regime took pains to preserve 
the “state” bureaucracy (salaries, services), delivering scarce resources (bread, fuel); 
but with the contraction of the state’s revenue, its distribution function waned and 
access to investment and jobs began to favour loyalist areas. As the decline of the army 
and bureaucracy led to a decentralization of power to local fiefdoms, the resulting 
centre-periphery relations became as much matters of personal loyalties and bargaining 
(material incentives, threats, divide and rule), as of bureaucratic command, contracting 
regime infrastructural power. The intimate interweaving of regime forces with those of 
Hizbollah, Iranian revolutionary guards and Shia Iraqi militias added to the loosening of 
control by the regime centre and the enhanced sectarian composition of this “post-
Ba’thist “ regime.2  
Jihadist Counter States: The most effective counters to the regime were the armed 
Islamists movements. Their expansion was driven by a combination of sectarianism, 
jihadist ideology and competition for control over resources. While Islamic State (IS) 
and Jahbat al-Nusra were the most radical and effective, the differences in doctrine and 
practices between them and the likes of Ahrar ash-Sham was only a matter of degree. 
Their recruitment pool was the vast Sunni underclass that was subjected to regime 
violence and saw itself fighting for survival or without any economic alternative to 
employment as fighters; foreign fighters also made up a significant contingent, of IS 
ranks in particular. These movements, like the regime, totally eschewed political 
compromise, backed by external support and their command of the war economy (e.g., 
oil wells). Their power-building practices were broadly similar—charismatic 
authoritarian leadership effective in mobilizing activist followers; yet exclusionary of all 
those who did not accept their visions of Islam. IS, in particular, acquired some of the 
attributes of statehood, including heavy weaponry, oil resources, bureaucratic capacity, 
control over cities, and the ability to provide a modicum of order and welfare where it 
governed. However, the jihadists could not shift the balance of power against the regime 
owing to their endemic infighting despite the various efforts of IS and al-Nusra to 
impose their domination (ICG 2013: 11-15; Lund 2013).  
Squeezing out civic alternatives: The local coordinating committees that organized 
the anti-regime protests, with discourses of Syrian civil identity based on common 
citizenship, morphed into local councils where regime control contracted. The councils 
initially had legitimacy, being either elected or self-selected by people from the region 
who had fought to protect it from the regime. Armed FSA groups, being local fighters, 
initially supported the councils and were represented on them. The councils were 
conceived of as an alternative government but largely failed to fulfil this function. 
Unable to raise funds they were dependent on funding from without. The Syrian 
National Council (SNC) and later the Syrian National Coalition and the Interim 
Government it set up were supposed to provide leadership for, deliver resources to and 
coordinate governance in opposition areas. Established in Turkey, this external 
leadership had little direct presence in Syria and little legitimacy at the grassroots. 
Donor resources did not sufficiently filter down to the grassroots and, the Interim 
Government being itself paralyzed by the rivalries of the funders to which it was 
beholden, with notably the Saudis and Qataris each inserting their own men, it fostered 
rather than ameliorated governance fragmentation. 
 
Over time, this civic alternative was squeezed between the regime and the jihadists. As 
the conflict deepened and was militarized, local councils faced competition as people 
turned to traditional authorities, such as tribal and religious notables and armed 
Islamist movements insofar as these provied a modicum of security (Syrian Centre for 
Policy Research, 2013). Islamist groups set up parallel institutions and often attacked 
the councils while the regime subjected the most successful ones to bombing or siege. 
Marginalized by violence, and suffering from the large-scale exit of secularists from 
Syria and the military incompetence of the FSA, the councils shrank from 800 in 2012 to 
400 in 2016, in parallel to the shrinking of their territory from 40% to 15% of the 
country. They survived in the local interstices between the regime and jihadists, usually 
in hybrid forms, wherein elements of Islamist militias and sharia courts shared power 
with elected councils composed of both more secular-minded activists and traditional 
notables (ulama, tribal leaders). Compared to the main warring sides, they were starved 
of resources and fragmented. In parallel, increasingly their coercive arm, the Free 
Syrian Army disintegrated into warlordism or turned Jihadist.3 
 
As for the Kurdish experiment in the northeast, although touted as a new model of 
pluralistic multi-ethnic mass participation, with ethnic quotas in various representative 
assemblies, its governance is best seen as “ethnic Leninism”: the more inclusive mass 
organizations and councils were controlled by a ruling party, the PYD, under the 
tutelage of PKK cadres-on-loan; repression of dissent, arrests of members of rival 
Kurdish parties, forced conscription---reproduced regime techniques. Instances of 
ethnic cleansing suggested this project may aim to maximize Kurdish ethnic purity in 
what had been mixed Arab-Kurdish areas (Khalaf 2016; Ali 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
The export of a flawed Westphalian states system to the global periphery was 
jeopardized in MENA from the outset, owing to the identity/territorial incongruity 
resulting from its arbitrary imposition. State building, combining historically indigenous 
“Khaldunian” techniques with imported Weberian bureaucratic institutions, resulted in 
neo-patrimonialism. Populist, rent funded, variants of neo-patrimonialism were initially 
inclusive enough to consolidate robust regimes for several decades, but went into 
decline as they were caught between neo-liberalization globalization, prompting a shift 
to more exclusionary regimes, and resistance to this from its victims. It took, however, 
external intervention, overt in Iraq, more covert in Syria, to translate this vulnerability 
into double state failure. 
State failure, notably the loss of monopoly of violence by the central government and 
militarized civil war, unleashed renewed—and extreme—manifestations of the region’s 
vulnerability to identity/territory incongruity: sectarian polarization, the 
empowerment of trans-state movements at the expense of the state, from al-Qaida to 
Hizbollah, the permeability, even collapse of borders, making Syria-Iraq a single space 
of political contestation, and the challenge to Sykes-Picot, especially by IS. State failure 
also spelled extreme vulnerability to proxy wars and rampant external interference 
culminating in the balkanization of the country into foreign spheres of influence—a 
descent into quasi-state semi-sovereignty. Filling the vacuum, however, were renewed 
forms of non-Westphalian “limited state” governance via Khaldunian practices by the 
rump of the Asad regime and its jihadist rivals, both less inclusive and commanding less 
infrastructural power than the pre-existing state, while also squeezing out more 
inclusive alternatives. This struggle co-existed with “heterarchy”--fragmented and 
overlapping jurisdictions, and a kind of Hobbesian neo-medievalism in which 
sovereignty was contested via the balance of violence among international, state and 
sub-state actors. The end (for the time being) of the Westphalian project in Syria can be 
seen in the extreme debilitation of both the Weberian state and of respect for Syrian 
sovereignty. 
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